c. Status of Camp Defensive Positions: See Incl 1. Troops are billeted
in the wall of the defensive perimeter with each CIDG Company having
a responsibility of defense of … [illegible] … of the defense
perimeter. All basic TOE weapons are in defensive positions at all times.
d. Intelligence Reports of Impending Attack: Indications of a large
VC initiated ground attack were observed in preparation in Loc Ninh
District since mid September 1967. In early October 1967 the time of
the suspected attack was determined to be between 22 and 30 November
1967. Most of the indications arrived from FWMF Agent Reports, VR's,
SPARS and observations by Special Forces operations. The only surprise
was the actual extent and duration of the attack. There were no indications
that a prolonged and fanatical attempt would be made against targets
in Loc Ninh. The 272d Regt, which participated in part in the Loc Ninh
attack had been located in the Bu Dinh Secret Zone Area since early
July, and with the exception of one southerly movement, remained continually
in this general area. The 273rd Regiment was noticed to have moved North
from its previous position in War Zone "C" to a position near
Dong Xoai in mid August. It was then noticed to have moved farther North
and finally, one week prior to the Loc Ninh attack, it crossed the song
Be and moved to a position Northwest of Loc Ninh and became the initial
and primary VC protagonist at Loc Ninh. The 165th Regiment had been
in the fishhook area since 7 August 1967 attack at Tong Le Chon and
was believed to have moved further northeast into Loc Ninh District
in early November 1967. One, and possibly two, battalions from the 165th
Regiment participated in attacks on Loc Ninh following the initial 29
October attack. The 84A Artillery Regiment was believed to have moved
its participating elements into northwest Phuoc Long [illegible] October
1967 while the 141st Regiment is not believed to have moved any [illegible]
units into the battle area, though personnel from the 141st Regiment
may have been assigned to other attacking units (captured documents
indicated a few KIA were from 141st Regiment). The headquarters supervising
the attack appeared to be the 9th VC Division Headquarters that moved
from a position in War Zone D when the 273d Regiment moved North and
entered Loc Ninh in latter September 1967, when Intelligence identified
extensive coordination between elements of the participating Regiments
at CT 9's location. All the above intelligence was know prior to the
attack.
e. Previous Requests for:
(1) Airstrikes (no airstrikes were scheduled)
(2) Artillery H&I (see Incl 4) 105mm Howitzer H&I is fired
nightly by ARVN Artillery in Camp. No record available.
(3) Combat Sky Spot - None were flown the night of the attack however
two were flown on 27 and 28 October 1967 (see Incl 4).
(4) Red Haze.
In the past two (2) months 2 image interprotation requests were made
of portions of Loc Ninh area. One request was a CICV readout which has
not been received yet. On 11 October a Red Haze request was submitted
and flown with some results, and a non-requested Red Haze mission flown
in October, produced the following; 6 firesites in jungle and 3 late
burning fires in villages.
(5) Aerial reconnaissance missions.
At least one VR was flown daily over Loc Ninh's TAOR by 5th ARVN Division
FAC's (USAF attachments). In addition to these normal VR's Phouc Vinh
AO's flew 3-4 VR's weekly over Loc Ninh's TAOR during October 1967,
as did 1st US division AO's who flew VR's periodicaly [sic] CICV II
readouts on Loc Ninh's TAOR were also forwarded to Loc Ninh during September
and October 1967.
(6) B-52 Strikes: No B-52 strikes were requested prior to the attack.
f. Status of Camp Logistics: There were no significant shortages of
critical items (ammunition, weapons, rations, communications) at Camp
Loc Ninh at the time of the attack. The below listed items were requested
and resupplied to Camp Loc Ninh on an "as required basis"
during the period of and following the attacks on the Camp.
(1) Food: A total of 9,800 indigenous rations were supplied to Loc Ninh
and numerous air sorties were flown to supplement the US rations with
fresh meats and vegetables from B-33 Hon Quan.
(2) Ammunition
(a) 105mm HE = 498 rnds
(b) 81mm HE = 320 rnds
(c) 81mm ILL = 710 rnds
(d) 60mm HE = 1400 rnds
(e) 60mm ILL = 1262 rnds
(f) M-79 HE = 1080 rnds
(g) 5.56 = 1300 rnds
(h) 30 Cal Carb. = 6200
(i) 30 Cal linked = 20, 000
(j) 30 Cal M-1 = 1,800
(3) Miscellaneous
(a) One (1) 2 ½ ton truck
(b) One (1) ¾ ton truck
(c) One (1) 2 ½ ton dump truck
(d) one (1) Water Pump
(e) Twelve (12) 2 ½ ton truck tires
g. Troop Morale and Discipline: Troop Morale was high especially after
the victory over the VC. AWOL rate was a little higher than normal but
there were no desertions after the first attack. AWOL rate is declining
gradually.
h. Absenteeism among civilian employees was higher than normal however
most came back after the third attack.
3. © Narrative description of attack:
a. At approx 290115 hrs Oct 1967 the Sub-Sector Compound North of Loc
Ninh XU 734088 began receiving 82mm mortar and heavy small arms and
automatic weapons fire from the NorthWest. At 290125 Camp Loc Ninh (Det
A-331) and Hon Quan began receiving mortar fire in and around the compound.
Loc Ninh received continuous heavy mortar fire until approximately 290250
hrs Oct 67 at which time it became sporadic. Hon Quan did not have any
rounds land inside the Special Forces compound. From the initial heavy
mortar attack at 290105, Loc Ninh Special Forces Camp Det A-331 received
approx 12 rounds inside the compound with 5 rounds landing in the vicinity
of the gate to the camp. Between 200220 the Province Chiefs house was
the traget [sic] for some 8-12 57RR rounds. Loc Ninh continued to receive
sporadic mortar fire until 200535. At 290115 the VC attacked the Sub-Sector
RF/PF compound XU 734088 with coordinated mortar and ground attack,
and at 290220 it was reported that VC were in the compound but could
not be confirmed by US until0520 [sic] at which time it was confirmed
that one US RF/PF Advisor and District Chief were in the Command Bunker
within the compound.
b. During the period 290115-290530 an estimated Battalion of the 273rd
VC Regiment supported by the 84th VC Artillery Battalion attacked camp
of Loc Ninh with mortar, rocket, heavy machine gun and small arms fire:
See Incl 3 Overlay. It is estimated that the camp received one hundred
eighty (180) 82MM and 120MM mortar rounds and fifteen (15) RPG-40 rounds.
The Camp went on full alert at 290115 and Forward Air Controllers, Spooky,
Light Fire teams and tactical air support were on station within fifteen
minutes and were continually supporting Loc Ninh throughout the night
and remained until the enemy broke contact at approximately 290520.
At this time Det A-331 Loc Ninh launched a two company (CIDG) operation
to relieve the RF/PF compound. By 291600 the RF/PF compound had been
secured and all VC expelled.
c. Loc Ninh had an operation in the field during the attack and made
significant contact resulting in 23 VC/NVA KIA.
d. After the attack ceased at 290530 the Special Forces Camp at Loc
Ninh immediately began improving their defensive posture and at 310050
they were again attacked by an estimated two Battalions of the 273d
VC Regiment supported by the 84th VC Artillery Battalion see Incl 3.
It is estimated that the camp received 200 rounds of 82mm and 120mm
mortar and 18 rounds of 122mm Rocket. Additionally the camp received
RPG-40 and RGP7V and recoilless rifle fire of undetermined caliber.
An estimated VC Battalion attempted to mass assault the camp but the
attack was broken up and the VC routed by a coordinated camp defensive
fires and tactical air strikes, which pinned the enemy and annihilated
him. At first light the enemy withdrew to the North East and NorthWest.
At 010200 Nov 67 Camp Loc Ninh received approx ten (10) 82mm mortar
rounds which is believed to have been suppressive fire to allow him
to recover his dead and wounded from the battlefield. Con…[illegible]…
was light and sporadic until 020060 Nov 67 when the enemy again attempted
to assault Loc Ninh by placing heavy 122mm Rocket fire on the camp and
attempted to mass a Battalion for an obvious "last ditch"
effort to overrun the camp. Again the attack was broken up and repelled
by the camps withering defensive fires and exceptionally well placed
Air strikes [sic]. After the final Air sorties the enemy was seen fleeing
in a disorganized manner in all directions. Sporadic contact was maintained
until dawn, presumably to allow the enemy to withdraw.
e. Enemy Units
a. Main Force
Approximately 9 NVA battalions were believed to have participated in
the Loc Ninh Attack from 29 October 67 - 04 November 67. These units
were: 3 Battalions from 273d Regiment believed located to West of 1-2
Battalions of 165th Regiment located Southwest of Loc Ninh. 2-3 Battalions
of 272d Regiment located East of Loc Ninh. Battalion (-) of 141st Battalion,
CT 9 (AA and mortars). Each battalion, except for heavy weapons battalion;
is believed to have had approx 300-400 men and to have been slightly
understrength. The heavy weapons battalion organically has less men
than an Infantry Bn.
b. Weapons.
Each Infantry Battalion was TO&E equipped with the usual Chicom/Soviet
small arms and crew served weapons. In addition, the 84A Artillery regiment
provided 120mm mortars and 122mm Rockets. One surface to air missile
was sighted by 2 US FAC's being fired and exploding in the air. Missile
was fired from an area approximately 8 Km West of Loc Ninh.
c. Tactics
No new tactics were employed by the enemy. The usual heavy mortar attack
followed by ground attacks, some from more than one direction was usually
preceded by squad size sapper units. A large attack had several waves
and at least 3 full scale attacks were launched during the heaviest
fighting. Usually the last offensive effort, prior to breaking contact,
was a ruse for a body recovery operation. Most attacks began
2 PAGES OF REPORT MISSING
c.Effects of friendly reactionary forces tactical Air and Artillery
on enemy withdrawal: Tactical Air Support, Artillery Support and reaction
forces were highly effective in disorganizing and destroying the enemies
[illegible] to mass. The most noteworthy examples of effective air support
were the [illegible] attacks against the Special Forces Camp that were
broken up primarily with aid of extremely accurate and continual Tactical
Air Support using 20mm [illegible]
d.Firm routes of withdrawal
(see Inclosure 5)
e.Disposition of enemy dead and wounded: At least 1000 enemy were left
on the battlefield with the remainder of the dead and wounded being
evacuated. Refugees from Loc Ninh District reported being forced to
carry VC dead. It is believed that most of the dead were buried in rear
assembly areas. Evacuated wounded were believed taken to various aid
stations, possibly using Montagnard conscripted litter bearers, who
were in turn taken to [illegible] in the Bu Dinh Secret Zone, Southwest
to Tay Ninh Province or across the border to Cambodia.
5. © RESULTS:
a. Friendly
(1) Casualties from 29 Oct -05 November 1967.
USASF: 4 WIA (Slight)
CIDG: 6 KIA, 39 WIA.
Weapons and equipment lost, damaged, destroyed or captured by item and
quantity.
5 ea 45 Cal Pistols Destroyed
12 ea M-1 Rifles destroyed
14 ea M-1 Carbines destroyed
15 ea M-2 Carbines destroyed
2 ea 30 Cal Mi9iA-6 MG8s destroyed
1 ea M0151 ¼ Ton destroyed
3 ea M-37 ¾ ton trucks destroyed
3 ea M-35A-121/2 ton Trucks destroyed
2 ea GP Medical Tent destroyed
1 ea GP (small) destroyed
2 ea Refrigeraters damaged
2 ea Generators damaged
1 ea RC-29Z Antennae damaged
3 ea CW antennas damaged
3 ea Buildings damaged
(3) Installation and defense positions damaged or destroyed
See Inclosure 2
(4) SOI's no SOI's were compromised or captured.
a. Casualties: Special Forces Camp A-331 accounted for 184 VC KIA (USBC),
negative CIA. ARVN's accounted for 285 VC KIA and 2 CIA. US Conventional
Units accounted for 550 VC KIA (USBC) 14 CIA. The dead were mostly Vietnamese
with some Montagnard, Chinese (Nungs) and Cambodians. The ethnic representation
of the dead is indicative of the ethnic make-up of the participating
units.
b. Weapons and equipment captured: Following are weapons and ordinance
captured by only CIDG during Loc Ninh contacts 29 October - 5 November
1967:
1. 1 - 30 Cal MG
2. 3 - RPG 40 launchers
3. 1 - RPG 7 launcher
4. 6 - AK 47's
5. 20 - RPG 40 Launchers
6. 50 - Hand Grenade
7. 500 - 50 Cal Machine Gun rounds
c. Captured documents: Captured documents included infiltration passes,
notebooks wallets and personal letters which identified the participating
units (to include support units such as Doan [illegible] 2 "Rear
Services Group 82"). The personal letters told of usual VC hardships.
There was little of intelligence value, either than unit identification,
recovered from the captured documents.
d. Other:
1. One refugee mentioned he was forced to bury a VC Officer (exact rank
unknown) who had a paper from Loc Ninh District (VC) Committee in his
body which stated that if the VC weren't successful at Loc Ninh, they
would all Chieu Hoi.
2. The only unusual weapons employed was the one FAC sighted surface
to air missile. The battle did use an extensive amount of 122mm rockets
and 120mm mortars as well as RPG-7's. This was the first use of 122mm
rockets in Binh Long and the most extensive use of the 120 mm mortar
in Minh Long Province. This was also the most extensive use of the RPG-7,
first use in this province on 10 July 1967 in Loc Ninh.
3. Organized and very heavy use of 50 cal type MG AA weapons were evidenced.
6. © Every effort was made by higher headquarters to assist the
Detachment after the initial attack with personnel augmentation and
increased logistical support. Due to the extremely adequate camp defense
very little was required in either case with the exception of equipment
that was destroyed as a result of a direct hit by indirect fire. Visitors
and curiosity seekers continue to be a problem after a camp is attacked
and their presence make command and control extremely difficult for
the detachment commander in reorganizing and rebuilding his camp defense
posture. Higher headquarters in the Special Forces or IIFFV Chain of
Command should assume responsibility of receiving and briefing VIP's
visitors and dignitaries in this situation.