d. From 20 January through 5 February, sporadic enemy mortar and artillery fire were received in and around Camp Lang Vei. This appeared to be zeroing and harassment fire.

e. From the 31st of January until the camp was overrun, small reconnaissance patrols and ambush patrols were initiated approximately one to three kilometers in all directions of the camp. The reconnaissance patrols had the mission of confirming locations of reported NVA troop positions. Only three of the above operations made contact that resulted in friendly or enemy KIA. Those results are as follows: Four friendlies KIA and seven WIA while enemy losses were three KIA one CIA.

3. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS DURING THE ATTACK AND EVACUATION:

a. 061045 February: Camp Lang Vei received an unknown number of enemy mortar rounds resulting in eight Camp Strike Force personnel being WIA. Counter mortar fires were placed on suspected enemy positions with unknown results.

b. 061810: An estimated 40 to 60 rounds of 152mm or 155mm artillery were received within the camp perimeter resulting in two Camp Strike Force personnel WIA and two bunkers damaged. Counter artillery fires were requested and received from Khe Sanh Combat Base with unknown results.

c. 070030: Camp Lang Vei reported it was under attack by an unknown number of tanks and infantry. It was stated that tanks were in the outer perimeter wire and that artillery and TAC Air had been requested.

d. 070100: Camp Lang Vei reported one "Spooky" on station in the vicinity of the camp. The VNSF channels at Detachment C-1 lost communications with Lang Vei. TAC Air was confirmed on the way by III MAF Hqs in Danang. "I " Corps Hqs reported that an additional Spooky was enroute to Lang Vei.

e. 070200: Camp Lang Vei reported that three or four tanks had been destroyed. A total of seven tanks had been seen by this time and were reported using searchlights to sweep the camp for possible targets.

f. 070240: Camp Lang Vei reported that there was one tank sitting on top of the tactical operations center. This tank had been destroyed. The camp also reported that the communications personnel were burning the commo material at this time.

g. 070320: Communications between Camp Lang Vei and "C" Company were lost. All the following messages were relayed from Khe Sanh Combat Base.

h. 070450; Tanks were reportedly departing Camp Lang Vei and taking up positions to the east of the camp. (NOTE: At 070540 "C" Company 5th SFGA asked III MAF to implement the Camp Lang Vei contingency plan to affect. One Battalion of marines had been requested. At 070545 one Mobile Strike Force Company from Danang was enroute to Quang Tri where it was to standby for a heliborne assault into Camp Lang Vei.)

i. 070630: A report from the USMC at Khe Sanh Combat Base indicated everything above ground at Camp Lang Vei had been destroyed.

j. 070630: The USMC at Khe Sanh Combat Base reported that the senior US Army Special Forces Adviser, SFC Ashley with the 33 Laotian Battalion had radio contact with the survivors located in the TOC at Camp Lang Vei.

k. 070740: Report received from Khe Sanh Combat Base that 15 personnel were alive in the TOC at Camp Lang Vei.

l. 070830: SFC Ashley departed the old camp area (XC 794361) enroute to new Camp Lang Vei with one company of Laotians. SFC Ashley reported that air strikes were still being run against the enemy in and around the camp.

m. 071030: SFC Ashley was directing air strikes against enemy held positions in Camp Lang Vei.

n. 071030: The Laotian element led by USASF Advisers reportedly had made five assaults on enemy positions attempting to reach Camp Lang Vei's TOC and the 15 survivors. Each attempt had been turned back by heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire. On the last attempt the senior USASF Adviser, SFC Ashley, was critically wounded. At this time the Laotian element withdrew back to the old camp area.

o. 071300: Khe Sanh Combat Base reported TAC AIR and artillery still being used in support of the personnel remaining in Camp Lang Vei's TOC. The USASF Advisers with the Laotian element still had contact with the survivors in Lang Vei's TOC.

p. 071500: A 50 man C&C element was being briefed at FOB-3 Khe Sanh Combat Base in preparation for rescue of the 15 personnel remaining in Camp Lang Vei's TOC.

q. 071515: Khe Sanh Combat Base reported VC/NVA all along highway #9 between Camp Lang Vei and Khe Sanh Combat Base in Ambush positions.

r. 071530: The senior USASF Adviser now located at old Lang Vei Camp had coordinated with the TAC AIR to drop their ordnance in the vicinity of the TOC in hopes of killing the enemy forces located above the TOC. After the aircraft dropped their ordnance, they were to make dummy passes across the camp in an attempt at keeping enemy heads down while the TOC survivors attempted to depart the camp. They were picked up at the camp main gate by Detachment C-1 VNSF S-3 in a vehicle without incident and reunited with other survivors at the old campsite.

s. 071630: Khe Sanh Combat Base reported choppers carrying C&C rescue element had departed for vicinity old Camp Lang Vei.

t. 071700: The C&C rescue element had linked up with Camp Lang Vei survivors at old campsite. Survivors were estacted [sic] to Khe Sanh by CH-46 and flown to Khe Sanh Combat Base.

u. 071030: Khe Sanh Combat Base reported survivors from Camp Lang Vei enroute back to Da Nang by fixed wing aircraft. C&C rescue element reported linking up with additional Camp Strike Force personnel employing escape and evasion techniques east of the new camp. Number of survivors enroute back to Da Nang totaled 92.

v. The Survivors from Camp Lang Vei, maintaining their previous tactical intregity [sic] and the same Detachment designation of A-101, have formed a new Mobile Strike Force company presently training at the Mobile Strike Force Headquarters, Da Nang RVN.

4. FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS:

a. The enemy attacked and over ran Camp Lang Vei with a force consisting of 12 tanks some of which were identified as (PT-76 Soviet Amphibious Type) and approximately 400 infantry troops of which one company is believed to have been sappers.

b. The enemy attack was supported by an estimated four 152mm artillery pieces and four 82MM mortars.

c. Enemy losses are estimated to have been seven tanks (confirmed) and two tanks (probable) and 250 infantry troops KIA.

d. Regular NVA units in mass have superior fire power to main force VC units and are therefore better suited to attacking fortified positions.

e. Despite Camp Lang Vei's inadequate anti tank defenses and lack of psychological conditioning for an armored attack, the CSF put up a spirited defense and did not break and run. Well over one half of the CSF died defending their positions, actually trying to fight tanks with MGs, carbines and rifles.

f. Camp Lang Vei's anti tank weapons consisted of two 106RR and 100 LAWs.

g. More emphasis should be placed on anti tank defenses by all Camp Strike Force Camps to include anti tank training for all personnel and the construction of tank obstacles.

h. Camp Strike Force Camps which have TAOR's contiguous to other countries must have a TAOR that extends out in all directions from the camp sufficiently far to insure the capability of fixing the enemy and providing early warning through continuous reconnaissance. The limited east-west operational area imposed by the RVN-Laotian border severely restricted this capability at Lang Vei. Tactical surprise was achieved by the introduction of a new weapons system from an unexpected direction.

i. The Mobile Strike Force company which had been moved to Quang Tri to reinforce the camp could not be displaced further due to lack of helicopters.

j. The camp defenses at Camp Lang Vei stopped the attack. It could not move beyond the camp toward Khe Sanh. The position could have been restored by one Mobile Strike Force company at the time of evacuation. It could have been restored earlier by the Laotian Battalion had they been only slightly aggressive. The restoration would have been of doubtful value due to the utter destruction of the camp.

k. COFRAM was fired on Camp Lang Vei three times during the morning of February with unknown results.

5. PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION:

ASSIGNED ATTACHED & PFD		WIA	KIA/MIA	RETURNED TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL
USASF	24	13	10	14
VNSF	14	3	5	9
CSF	282	29	165	117
MSF	161	32	34	127
INTERPRETERS	6	0	5	1
	487	77	219	268

 

ASSIGNEDATTACHED & PFD WIA KIA/MIA RETURNED TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL
USASF 24 13 10 14
VNSF 14 3 5 9
CSF 282 29 165 117
MSF 161 32 34 127
INTERPRETERS 6 0 5 1
487 77 219 268

2 Incl
1. Intelligence Summary
2. Personal Statements