INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY OF REPORTS AND INCIDENTS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK ON LANG VEI A-101

1. During the past six months the enemy situation in the Khe Sanh-Lang Vei area was characterized by inactivity of major enemy units with very few contacts. During the month of December enemy reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance activity increased noticeably, and usually reliable sources indicated large enemy units were being concentrated in the area. At this time it was considered probable that major ground action against CIDG and USMC installations in the Khe Sanh-Lang Vei area would be conducted as part of the Tri-Thien Winter-Spring Campaign.

2. Intelligence reports from Lang Vei indicated a definite increase in enemy activity during the month of January. There were reports of enemy units crossing the Se Pone River from Laos into Viet Nam, and a captured document mentioned division, regiment, and battalion sized units. By the middle of the month, one agent had reported that an unidentified regiment had moved into the A-101 TAOR. During this time there were several usually reliable reports of enemy activity within the TAOR.

3. Along with the agent reports, there was an increase in the enemy's probing of camp defenses. Camp operations began to make contact with small enemy units. On 24 January, III MAF COC reported that a USAF FAC had sighted five tanks in the vicinity of XD 653374. An airstrike was called, and the FAC reported one tank destroyed and the others moving west into trees along HWY $9. On 30 January, a security patrol from the discovered [sic] a road capable of supporting heavy vehicle traffic, running northeast along a stream bed XD 755354 to XD 782382.

On 30 January, Luong Dinh Du of the 8th Bn, 66th Regt, 304th Div, rallied at Camp Lang Vei. Subject stated that his battalion was at half strength due to the attack against Khe Sanh District on 21 January, and from subsequent airstrikes and artillery missions. Subject also stated that the battalion XO and one squad of sappers reconnoitered the Lang Vei Camp on the night of 28 January. Their mission was to pinpoint weapons location and to study camp defenses. Subject's company had been alerted to attack Lang Vei on two occasions; both times the attack was cancelled. Subject stated that his battalion would attack the camp in the near future. The reports and incidents listed above indicate that the camp defenders had reason to expect a probable large scale ground attack, possibly supported by armored vehicles. As result, the camp was supplied with LAWs, and the defenders trained in their use. Approximately ten of the CIDG fired familiarization. Over half the Americans had fired a LAW prior to the attack.