GENERAL NARRATIVE OF EVENTS

24 January - 5 February 1968

On 24 January 1968, the 33d Royal Laotian Battalion was overrun in Laos by NVA forces utilizing tanks. The Laotians, 520 soldiers and 220 dependants, withdrew across the border to Lang Vei. The dependents were moved into Lang Vei village and the Laotian Battalion was located on the site of the old Camp Lang Vei until arrangements could be completed for their air evacuation back to Laos. Apparently the Laotians had no real knowledge as to the identity of the enemy force which attacked them, for both the 304th NVA Division and the 325th NVA Division were reported by the Laotians as the unit which attacked them. The Laotian soldiers and dependents were furnished rice, powdered milk, and PIR's to supplement the rice. All 2700 of them were inoculated against cholera by USASF advisory personnel. Ammunition, barrier materials, and tools were furnished the Laotian battalion in order that they could refortify the defenses of the old camp.

One hundred additional M-72 LAW's and additional 106mm RR ammunition were delivered to Camp Lang Vei to strengthen the camp's defenses against an attack by armored vehicles. In spite of the fact that he knew that the enemy had an armor capability, Captain Willoughby stated that the camp did not expect an attack in which tanks would physically penetrate the camp defenses. He believed that any attack on the Special Forces camp would consist of ground forces attempting to penetrate the camp defenses with fire support being furnished by the tanks from outside the perimeter wire. Willoughby suspected that the tanks were intended for an attack against the Khe Sanh combat base.

Instruction on the M-72 LAW was presented to the Camp Strike Force and Mobile Strike Force personnel and limited familiarization firing was conducted. Captain Willoughby estimated that 75 - 85 LAW's were on hand after the training program and familiarization firing was completed. Because the Laotian Battalion Commander, a Colonel, desired someone of more equal rank at Lang Vei, LTC Schungel adopted the policy of keeping one field grade officer on site.

6 -7 February 1968

On 6 February at approximately 1030 hours, camp Lang Vei came under mortar attack. Three rounds landed within the perimeter and wounded eight Camp Strike Force personnel. LTC Schungel arrived at Lang Vei that afternoon and replaced LTC Headley (XO, Co C) as the field grade officer on site. At approximately 1800 hours the camp again came under attack; 40 - 559 rounds of estimated 152mm artillery were received in the southern perimeter wire generally in the 104 company area. Two soldiers were wounded and two bunkers were damaged.

Special Handling Required
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
By Authority of Co, 5th SFGA. Date 22 Mar 68
[Security Classification downgraded at 12 year intervals; declassified after 12 yrs. DOD DIR 5200.10]
Incl 8 to 5th SFGA ORLL for the Period Ending 30 April 1968

During both the morning and the evening attacks, the camp placed counterfire on the suspected enemy gun locations utilizing the two 4.2" mortars and the two 106 mm Recoilless Rifles. All firing ceased at approximately 1900 hours. At approximately 1930 hours, troops within the 104 Company area reported hearing noises, similar to engines running, coming from the vicinity of Lang Troai (XD780344) south of the camp. The Mobile Strike Force OP to the west (SC778531) reported hearing noises. At approximately 2100 hours, three trip flares were triggered in the MSF OP area. The MSF soldiers manning the OP commenced firing and soon the CIDG in the base camp were firing also. Order was restored and the firing ceased. At approximately 2240 hours, a trip flare went off in the outer perimeter wire south of 104 Company on the road leading to Lang Troas. Again, most of the camp opened fire; however, within a few minutes the firing ceased. At 2249 hours SSG Brooks, from the supply bunker located on the south side, reported movement on the road. Two 81Mm mortar illumination rounds were fired and two tanks were observed in the wire. About one platoon of enemy troops was also seen in the 104 Company area outer wire. 104 Company immediately opened fire. At approximately the same time, to OP to the west came under attack by 60mm and 82mm mortar fire which was followed by a ground attack consisting of tanks and possibly as much as one company of infantry. Requests for FAC and air support were immediately made to both the Marines at Khe Sanh and Company C in Danang. Cpt Willoughby requested the Marines to fire preplanned Special Forces concentrations near the tanks and around the OP. The first mission was received after about 17 -20 minutes and was completely off the preplanned target area. CPT Willoughby did not know that the Khe Sanh combat base was receiving artillery fire at the same time camp Lang Vei was being attacked. The tanks had turned their lights on and were sweeping the area; however, small arms fire from the camp extinguished the lights. The tanks fired both their main armament and machine guns at the bunkers. By this time the 106mm RR on the south side was manned by SFC Holt who was later assisted by SFC Craig and SGT Tiroch. Holt knocked out both of the tanks that were in the southern perimeter wire.

At least three other tanks appeared on the road from Lang Troai and drove around the two disabled tanks toward 104 Company. The troops in 104 Company area were still engaged in fire with the enemy forces in their wire as the tanks rolled closer and penetrated the 104 Company defenses. Tank killer teams (LTC Schungel, LT Wilkins, LT Longgrear, LT Quy, SFC Brande, SGT Fragos, SGT Early, and SP5 McMurray) were fighting the tanks with M-72 LAW's. One of the tanks was immobilized and the three crewmen that crawled out were killed with grenades and small arms fire. The 57mm RR manned by an indigenous crew also fired at the tanks. USASF and indigenous personnel were observed climbing on tanks and attempting to throw grenades into the buttoned up tank moving west on highway 9 adjacent to the team hours [sic]. Armed with M72 Law's LT Wilkins engaged a tank which was moving west on highway 9. He scored one direct hit on the front end of the tank. Another LAW misfired. The tank moved west on the road closer to the dispensary. Wilkins fired a third LAW and hit the tank in the left tread with no noticeable effect.

The MSF OP had reported to the TOC that they were surrounded by NVA troops and were still under attack. Possibly four tanks followed by two platoons of ground troops were moving west on highway 9 toward the camp. 102 and 103 Company areas were assaulted by the NVA ground forces, who then withdrew. The infantry forces were predominantly armed with AK-47 assault rifles. Tanks then apparently penetrated the two company areas followed by the infantry.

Within approximately 45 minutes after 104 Company area was penetrated, the enemy tanks had driven the survivors out into CRP 1 and CRP 3 areas. The enemy troops that were following the tanks assumed firing positions in 104 Company area. Fighting was still raging in 101, 102, and 103 Company areas. The inner perimeter was receiving small arms fire but had not yet been penetrated by tanks.

USASF personnel at Old Camp Lang Vei were firing 81 HE and illumination in support. As of yet, they had not received any mortar or small arms fire. Specialist Johnson spotted two tanks on the supply drop zone which was located between old camp Lang Vei and the camp under attack (vicinity XD791358).

When Company C made their initial request to III MAF COC for air support, they were informed that "Spooky", FAC, and TAC AIR were already on station over the Khe Sanh combat base. Personnel at Camp Lang Vei were unable to establish radio contact with them. At 0055 hours a FAC finally established radio contact with Camp Lang Vei. He informed CPT Willoughby that fighter aircraft were on the way. "Spooky" was on station by 0101 hours. CPT Willoughby had monitored a conversation between the FAC and "Spooky". Initially "Spooky" was so high and far away from the camp (probably over Khe Sanh combat base) that the FAC could not locate him. "Spooky" was concerned about the effect of tank fire on his aircraft and said something to the effect that he could not do anything to the tanks, but they could sure work on him. CPT Willoughby requested fire on the south edge of the perimeter. "Spooky" never delivered the fire.

Fighter aircraft were orbiting on station shortly after 0100 hours. At 0136 hours a bomb was accidentally dropped on the old camp site where SFC Ashley, SGT Allen, and SP4 Johnson were located with the Laotian battalion. There were no casualties. Airstrikes were delivered along the ravine on the north side of camp Lang Vei, on the road to Lang Troai south of the camp and to the west of the MSF OP. By this time (0200 hours), both of the 106mm RR had been knocked out by the enemy tanks - but not before SFC Holt managed to knock out his third enemy tank, one that had penetrated 104 Company area. When he fired the last 106mm HEAT round located at his position, SFC Holt left the 106mm RR. Almost immediately afterwards, a blast from an enemy tank destroyed the recoilless rifle and the beehive rounds collocated with the weapon. It is believed that Holt had previously fired two or three beehive rounds at the enemy ground forces.

Marine artillery fire was directed on 104 Company area and adjusted on target by "walking" it in from the south. 105mm illumination support was also received from the Marines until "Spooky" and a flareship assumed this role.

A large concentration of enemy (approximately one company) attempted to penetrate the northern wire opposite e101 Company area. A request for preplanned fires into the area was made to the Marines. The mission initially landed on top of the camp, but was adjusted on target. The artillery and effective small arms fire from 101 Company stopped the assault. However, enemy sappers and tanks had penetrated 101 Company area from 104 Company area and forced 101 Company to pull back into CRP2 and CRP 3 areas. The entire eastern end of the "dogbone" shaped camp was lost. Shortly afterwards, the tanks and NVA forces in 102 and 103 Company areas took the western end of the "dogbone". Communications were lost with both companies. Apparently the CIDG were not able to withdraw into the inner perimeter. Survivors stated that they moved out of the camp north of 102 Company area and then east - some to the old camp site and some to Khe Sanh. Artillery was then called in on both ends of the camp. Both the eastern and western ends of the camp had now been overrun, and tanks were approaching the inner perimeter from both directions.

At approximately 0230 hours, communications with the MSF OP were lost. SFC Lindwald had been seriously wounded by automatic weapons fire in the chest or abdomen. Survivors from the OP escaped to the south and last saw SFC Hanna, who was also wounded, administering first aid to Lindwald on top of the OP as it was about to be overrun. SFC Craig, SFC Burke, SSG Thompson, SSG Tiroch and SP5 Phillips were occupying a position on the western side of the team house. It was approximately 0245 hours when a tan [illegible]olled from 103 Company area past supply bunker #1 and appeared to be headed toward the 4.2" mortar pit. Along with approximately 40 - 50 CIDG personnel, this group attempted to escape and evade through the northern perimeter wire. Machine gun fire from the eastern end of the camp prevented Craig and Tiroch from getting through the wire. Eventually the two Americans succeeded in getting through the wire. They moved approximately 100 meters north of the wire into a clump of bamboo. After being wounded by CBU fragments, the two moved another 100 - 200 meters into a dry creekbed and remained there the rest of the night.

A tank from 104 Company area penetrated the inner perimeter wire near the 81mm mortar pit #2 (about 30 meters from the tactical operations center bunker, TOC). The tank destroyed the mortar position with its main armament. LTC Schungel, LT Wilkins, LT Quy, (VNSF S3, Det C-1), Lt Longgrear. SSG Brooks, SGT Fragos, and SP4 McMurray (Tank killer teams) had moved back to the TOC in search of more LAW's and were behind the double row of 55 gallon drums that stood in front of the TOC east entrance. Enemy ground forces (sappers and infantry) were also approaching the TOC from the direction of 104 Company area; however effective small arms fire from LT Quy, LT Longgrear and SP5 McMurray had stopped them. Brooks, Fragos, and Longgrear went downstairs into the TOC for more LAW's. The tank, which was buttoned up, rolled past the 81MM mortar position that it had just destroyed and stopped approximately 15 meters from the TOC entrance. A LAW was fired at the tank but it had no effect. It fired its main armament straight at the TOC entrance. SP4 Mc Murray was blinded and had both hands mangled by the blast. LT Wilkins was crushed by the heavy barrels which were filled with large rocks and dirt. LTC Schungel was knocked flat and temporarily dazed but suffered only minor cuts and a fragmentation wound in the hip. LT Longgrear knew that LTC Schunget had been standing directly in front of the tanks direction of fire and reported to CPT Willoughby that he had been killed by the blast. The tank remained at the east end of the TOC for approximately 15 minutes. LTC Schungel had by then regained his senses and coordination. He then pulled McMurray behind the protection offered by the sandbags at the TOC entrance. Wilkins was conscious by this time and could walk, although not very well. LT Quy was unhurt and suggested that they find a place in which to hide. LTC Schungel agreed. LT Quy left the TOC, but another tank approaching the western end of the TOC prevented Schungel and Wilkins from following. The tank fired its main gun at the observation tower. The blast slightly wounded SP4 Moreland who was climbing the ladder to the tower exit. SGT Early, who was already in the tower, suffered shrapnel wounds on the head and shoulders. Trapped in the TOC with both exits caved in were the following USASF personnel: CPT Willoughby, LT Longgrear, SSG Brooks, SSG Phillips, SGT Early, SGT Fragos, SP4 Moreland and SP4 Dooms. The VNSF camp commander, the VNSF SGM, the 104 Company Commander, one interpreter and one CIDG commo man were also in the TOC according to Willoughby. The time was approximately 0300 hours.

LTC Schungel threw two grenades under the tank which had just collapsed the tower. Almost simultaneously a weapon (probably a LAW) struck the tank in the rear. The hatch was opened but nothing came out except flames. LTC Schungel and LT Wilkins then sought refuge in the team house. Shortly after they left the TOC, personnel inside the TOC heard McMurray talking outside of the TOC. At approximately 0330 hours a party of five NVA armed with AK-47 assault rifles and satchel charges approached the northern door of the team house. LTC Schungel killed all five with his M16 rifle. A satchel charge, or some type of explosive, hit the team house wounding LTC Schungel in the right leg. The two Americans left the team house and cautiously made their way undetected to the dispensary about 0400 - 0430 hours. They hid themselves under the northern end of the building behind a wall of sandbags. Two tanks approached just south of the dispensary and the dispensary was occupied by approximately one platoon of NVA soldiers during the night. LTC Schungel and LT Wilkins quietly remained under the dispensary the rest of the night.

After LT Longgrear reported to CPT Willoughby that LTC Schungel had been killed, Willoughby believed that the personnel in the TOC were the only US personnel still alive in the camp. At approximately 0320 hours the TOC lost all communication with the outside. The radios were still in good condition; however, the primary and secondary antennae had all been cut by tanks or enemy explosives. Prior to this, communications had been outstanding. After the enemy attempted to swing in satchel charges from each end of the TOC, the personnel inside remained clear of the entrances. Fragmentation grenades, incendiary grenades, and CN or CS gas grenades were thrown into the TOC by the NVA. Breathing was extremely difficult. Some utilized gas masks. Others used a hankerchief or first aid packet or mearly kept their head close to the clearer air near the floor. The VNSF camp commander and all the other Vietnamese personnel in the TOC then climbed over the rubble and outside the TOC in response to a voice from the outside which said in Vietnamese, "We are going to blow up the bunker, so give up." About fifteen minutes later, automatic weapons fire was heard outside of the TOC. The employment of satchel charges in the bunker air vents and tossing of grenades continued. At approximately 0600 hours, a satchel charge blew in a large portion of the north wall and seriously wounded SP4 Moreland in the head. About 0700 hours, CPT Willoughby was wounded by a grenade that exploded approximately one and a half feet away. The flack jacket he held in front of his upper body stopped most of the fragments and perhaps saved his life. CPT Willoughby lost consciousness at approximately 0830 hours.

Unknown to the personnel in the TOC, efforts were being made by SFC Ashley, SGT Allen, and SP4 Johnson (Old Camp Lang Vei) to relieve the trapped Americans. After much persuasion, approximately 60 Laotians were mustered to participate in a relief operation. The three Americans led the Laotians west on highway 9 toward Camp Lang Vei. The party encountered a group of approximately 20 -40 CIDG survivors near the road and the Americans persuaded them to assist in the operation. The initial assault led by the Americans, was conducted up the length of 101 Company area. When they reached the end of 101 Company area, they began to receive machine gun or automatic small arms fire after which the indigenous troops broke and ran back toward highway 9. The Americans were therefore forced to withdraw. By this time, SFC Craig and SSG Tiroch had left their hiding place in the creekbed and had stumbled upon the Laotian troops and the three Americans near the gate on highway 9. SFC Ashley directed airstrikes on the camp and then the five Americans let a second assault which met similar results. A third assault was attempted but failed. Airstrikes were directed on target by SFC Ashley between each assault.

Meanwhile, LTC Schungel and LT Wilkins hobbled out from under the vacated dispensary at approximately 0930 hours. Two burned out tanks were located just west of the dispensary. They had apparently been hit by aircraft and were reduced to rubble. The two wounded men went to the northern side of highway 9 where LTC Schungel was again wounded, this time by shrapnel in the thigh. With the assistance of a CIDG soldier, he and LT Wilkins arrived at the east gate entrance to the camp where they were taken to the Laotian camp.

At approximately 1000 hours the TOC regained communications with SFC Ashley. When CPT Willoughby regained consciousness, it was approximately 1100 hours and the American led Laotian - CIDG group was on their fourth assault. The approach this time was between 101 and 104 Company areas, but the same opposition and same results were met. Between each assault the Americans had to pull back and rally the indigenous troops. In come cases the indigenous troops ran all the way back to old Camp Lang Vei. On the fifth and last assault witch carried to within 30 meters of the TOC, SFC Ashley was hit in the right chest by small arms fire. The assault faltered and the indigenous troops again withdrew in spite of American efforts to get them to hold their positions. SGT Allen and SP4 Johnson pulled Ashley out of the line of enemy fire toward the road where Ashley was put in a ¼ ton truck and carried back to the old camp. First Allen and then Johnson continuously administered mouth to mouth resuscitation to SFC Ashley. Back at the old camp, which was now receiving enemy artillery rounds, SP4 Johnson continued this critical work. An artillery round struck within 15 meters of their location. SP4 Johnson was knocked unconscious and shrapnel mortally wounded SFC Ashley.

All five attempts to relieve the trapped Americans had failed and the Marines at the Khe Sanh combat base had elected not to reinforce the camp according to the existing contingency plan. Requests for assistance from the Marines had been made on two separate occasions by CPT Willoughby. At 0540 hours CPT Edwards (S3, Co C) requested COL Smith (G3 Opns Officer, III MAF) to implement the contingency plan. A conference call among COL Smith, General Cushman (CG, III MAF), General Tompkins (CG, 3d Marine Div), General Westmoreland (COMUSMACV), and LTC Hoadley (XO, Co C) was then conducted. Because it was believed that the attack might be coordinated major attack against both the Special Forces camp and the Khe Sanh combat base, Lang Vei was not reinforced. Shortly after noon on 7 February, COL Ladd (CO, 5th SFGA) accompanied by LTC Hassinger (DCO, Special Opns(, briefed General Westmoreland on the situation at Lang Vei and the requirement to evacuate the survivors of the attack. Also in attendance at this meeting were General Chaisson (Chief COC MACV), General Cushman, General Tompkins, in whose area of responsibility Lang Vei lay [sic], General Anderson (CG, 1st Marine Airwing), and several other officers. LTC Hassinger then briefed the group on a plan to helilift ten Americans and 40 CIDG from FOB #3 into old Lang Vei. There was considerable argument against implementing the plan because of the possibility of losing more men as well as the helicopters. General Westmoreland finally directed that the aircraft be made available to support the movement of the reaction force from FOB #3 into Lang Vei and extract the survivors. COL Ladd coordinated with General Anderson on the aircraft support requirements.

After his arrival at the old camp site, LTC Schungel established communications with MAJ Quamo at FOB #3 and coordinated with him on the plan to bring in a fifty man reaction force to evacuate the USASF and more seriously wounded indigenous personnel. Via PRC 25 radio, LTC Schungel and CPT Willoughby devised and coordinated a plan for the escape of the Americans from the TOC. CPT Willoughby carefully oriented the FAC as to the location of the TOC and directed airstrikes by AIE Skyraiders in on top of the camp. After the last bombs were dropped and the last strafing runs were conducted, the seven man group climbed out of the TOC entrance in single file led by LT Longgrear. CPT Willoughby and SSG Phillips carried SGT Early at the rear of the file. SP4 Moreland was still frantic and uncontrollable and had to be left in the TOC. The group received continued ineffective fire and continued northeast past supply bunker [illegible] to highway 9. Lt Quy (who had been captured by the NVA, escaped, and evaded to old Lang Vei) met them at the east gate with the ¼ ton truck and drove them back to the old camp site.

At approximately 1715 hours MAJ Quamo and the reaction force from FOB #3 arrived on site. Supporting the exfiltration were two FAC's, six AIE aircraft, four jet fighters, five or six Army and Marine helicopter gunships and four Marine CH-46 helicopters. A UH-1D (slick) landed first on the old Lang Vei airstrip (vicinity XD796364). MAJ Quamo directed the entire operation. LTC Schungel, Craig, Johnson, and Wilkins were evacuated on this first helicopter. Four Marine Ch-46 helicopters then landed the reaction force to secure the landing zone during extraction of the remaining Americans and wounded indigenous troops. As the big ships landed, they were mobbed by the frantic Vietnamese and Laotian troops who had to be physically thrown off the choppers. The more seriously wounded indigenous troops were taken by the last helicopter. The evacuation of all US survivors was completed with one exception. LT Todd had spent most of the attack by himself in the emergency medical bunder [sic]. At Approximately 1700 hours, he left the emergency medical bunker and proceeded to the TOC in hopes that he would find some Americans there. He saw only Moreland, who appeared to be dead. He immediately left the TOC and spotted a helicopter leaving the airstrip near the old camp site. He proceeded to the airstrip and was evacuated by helicopter along with four Americans from FOB ##. CIDG survivors who escaped and evaded to the Khe Sanh combat base were initially relieved of their weapons by the Marines and turned away at the gate. As soon as it was discovered that this was happening, LTC Hoadley coordinated with the Marines and arrangements were made to receive and process the survivors as them appeared. Approximately 160 survivors made their way to the Khe Sanh combat base between the evening of 7 February and 1600 hours on 8 February and were transported to C Company in Danang.