CPT FRANK C. WILLOUGHBY
We received 40-50 rounds of 152mm artillery in the afternoon of the
6th. All rounds landed in the southern perimeter wire, mostly in the
area of 104 Company (southeast corner of camp). At about 1930, the CIDG
in 104 Co's area reported hearing noises in Lang Troai (XD 780 344).
They said that it sounded like engines running. At about the same time,
the Mobile Strike Force OP west of the camp reported hearing noises.
Sergeants Hanna and Lindewald were on this OP. At around 2100 hrs three
trip flares went off in the area of the Mobile Strike Force OP. Illumination
was fired with negative results. Next, around 2200, a trip flare went
off in 104 Co's area. When the first trip flares went off around 2100
in the area of the Mobile Strike Force OP, first the OP opened up with
their small arms and automatic weapons, and pretty soon the entire camp
had joined in. The same thing happened at 2200 when the trip flare went
off in 104 Co's area. They opened up with small arms and automatic weapons
fire and the entire camp joined in. The first indication of an actual
attack came at approximately 2330 hours. At this time 104 company reported
that there were enemy troops in the wire. 104 company opened up with
small arms and automatic weapons fire. Next, the MSF OP started receiving
incoming mortar rounds. My observer in the tower of the TOC reported
seeing lights on the road leading to Lang Troai. At this time, I alerted
the artillery in Khe Sanh and also C Company at Danang. About 15 minutes
later, my observer informed that there were two tanks sitting in our
outer perimeter were below 104 company. They were sweeping the hill
with their searchlights. I went up out of the TOC at this time and verified
that there were indeed two tanks setting there with their searchlights
on sweeping the hillside looking for our camp positions. I was informed
through an interpreter that 104 Company was fighting with enemy troops
in their wire. We finally got our artillery mission 15 minutes after
I had called for it. By this time, however, the tanks had already gotten
into the wire. We had the tanks pinpointed for the artillery on the
original mission and my biggest complaint was the delay we experienced
in getting the first mission fired. If we had received it in time, we
could have knocked out the tanks in the wire. We were manning our LAW's
and our 106's. 104 Company lasted about 45 minutes, until a tank got
into their area and started destroying their position with its main
battle gun. Two tanks were knocked out in the wire with our 106 and
they were sitting there smoking. Another tank came up by those two,
making a total of three that I had seen so far. This other tank pulled
around the two that were destroyed and rolled into 104 Company. He was
blowing bunkers apart and finally 104 Company fell. These troops pulled
into our inner perimeter and the positions which they had left were
occupied by the NVA. The tank remained in 104 Company's area. The next
report I received was that there was a tank coming up Highway 9 just
below Supply bunker number 2. At about the same time I was receiving
reports that three tanks were coming up Highway 9 just below the MSF
OP. I also received a report that there were two tanks setting in the
drop zone between Highway 9 and Lang Vei Village. The tank that had
been in 104 Company's area eventually moved on into 101 Company's area.
He may have been the one that came up Highway 9 below supply bunker
number two but I remember later that I saw no break in the wire to indicate
that this was the same tank that had moved to Highway 9. Now, another
tank came up behind the two that were destroyed in the wire. He pulled
on through 104 Company's area and on up to the top of the hill. His
gun was pointing west across the camp. At the same time a tank came
up from the West and began to operate in 102 Company's area. This is
probably the same one that was observed coming up Highway 9 below supply
bunker number two. While this tank was working in 102 Company, I received
reports that enemy troops had surrounded the MSF OP west of the camp,
that the enemy was manning positions in 104 Company's area, and also
that
Enemy troops were coming across the wire on the north side of the camp.
Just before 104 Company fell, I observed what I thought to be an enemy
soldier with a backpack flamethrower on his back. I never actually saw
it employed, but there … [illegible] fires going and this particular
individual was standing between two of the fires. I saw no similar apparatus
being carried by any of the other enemy troops. The only enemy troops
I had seen up to this time were the ones in 104 Company's area. I would
estimate about a platoon in strength was occupying positions in 104
Company's area. And perhaps another squad of sappers just on the inner
perimeter on the east end of the camp. The troops that reportedly came
from the north and west I never saw. The troops on the northern side
of the camp were reported to me by LTC Schungel. The troops on the west
end of the camp were reported by the commander of 103 Company and by
Sergeant Hanna. Sergeant Hanna just said that they were surrounded on
their OP. The POL dump was gone. Tac Air, "Convoy" FACs, and
Spooky were all on station. We were receiving good support from Khe
Sanh at this time, I guess about 0045 hours. I was in, on, or around
the TOC at all times. I had six wounded Americans in the TOC with me.
The flares from the camp had stopped, and I had requested some from
Khe Sanh. The 81mm Mortar pit on the East side of the camp was knocked
out. The 4.2 mortar pit on the west side of the camp was knocked out….
The remaining Americans were manning the two 50 caliber machine guns
and the 106. The other 106, on the East side of the camp, had been knocked
out at about 0045 hours. Our 106's were employed from 2340 hours until
0115 hours at which time the last 106 was knocked out by a tank. This
106 was on the west end of the camp. At this time, enemy sappers were
busy with satchel charges in 104 and 101 company's areas. The 104 company
personnel who had withdrawn into our inner perimeter were firing on
the sappers. One of the tanks came from the west, went across 104 company
and into 101 company and blasted the bunkers. Next, a tank from the
west took up station to the rear of the 81mm mortar pit on the east
end of the camp. This one knocked out the 81mm mortar and the 106 that
I mentioned earlier. We got him with a LAW, however, he continued to
fire his 50 caliber. Another tank appeared - this was the fifth one-
and came up within ten meters of the main entrance to the TOC. LTC Schungel,
LT Longgrear, and I were standing by the door. They were manning LAW's
and I was adjusting fire. I went into the TOC. About 1 ½ minutes
later, Lt Longgrear came down also and about one minute later the tank
shattered the entrance to the TOC where LTC Schungel had been standing.
The tank remained out there for about 15 minutes. We demolished the
entrance to the TOC and was working on the tower. At this time Sergeant
Early was wounded. He was the observer in the tower of the TOC. A tank
on the west end of the camp pulled up on the main road running down
the center of the camp and knocked out our last 106 on the west end
of the camp. He started rolling up toward the TOC. We had two tanks
on top of the hill now. The tanks which Sergeant Hanna reported as coming
up Highway 9 in the vicinity of the Mike Force OP apparently didn't
enter the camp perimeter wire, but just sat outside instead. At this
time both the entrance and exit of the TOC were blocked and to my knowledge
the personnel in the TOC were the only remaining U.S. personnel in the
camp. The time was about 0300. Personnel in the TOC included myself,
Lt Longgrear, Sergeant Phillips, Early, Fragos, Moreland, and Dooms.
Down there also were the VNSF camp commander, the VNSF Sergeant Major,
the Company commander of 104 company, my interpreter Minh, and a CIDG
commo man. The tanks finished their mopping up. One was sitting on top
of the TOC and remained there about 20 minutes. While he was on top
of us, he continued to fire his armament, both the main gun and the
automatic weapon. At the same time satchel charges were being thrown
down the main entrance and the tower. Our communications with the outside
were gone. The stairway and the tower were knocked out. Satchel charges
and grenades came in sporadically for the next four hours. Just before
we received the satchels, a voice came down saying something like: "This
is LT Wilkins, Who's down there?" Immediately there after an automatic
weapon was fired down the tower. Bullets ricocheted all over. Whoever
had called down the tower spoke very good English, but I didn't know
if it was Wilkins or not. Wilkins told me later that he had called down
to us. A few minutes after Wilkins called another voice called down.
People close to the voice said that it was Specialist McMurry. This
voice also was followed by automatic fire into the TOC. We were receiving
satchel charges and grenades. I had extinguished all lights in the TOC.
Commo was lost with all personnel on the hill and with C Company. We
still had contact with Khe Sanh. This was about 0400. As I said, we
then received four hours of satchel charges, thermite grenades, gas
grenades and [illegible] type grenades. The thermite grenade was thrown
down the tower at about 0600, and it started a fire. Immediately after
it was thrown down the tower, gas grenades - CS or CW - were thrown
in on us, followed by satchel charges from the East and West and of
the TOC. The fire wasn't spreading because there was very little ventilation
down there. I guess it lasted about 20 minutes. The gas stayed around
for a long time. I gave my mask to someone else and I kept my face very
close to the floor to avoid the gas. When the thermite and gas grenades
went off, the sappers on top of the TOC called down through the tower
and the stairway in Vietnamese. They were saying: "We are going
to blow up the bunker, so give up." The indigenous troops all surrendered.
All I could see were black indigenous troops at the top of the stairs
being stripped down. All their weapons were taken and a couple of the
indigenous troops were stripped down to their shorts. Talk was going
back and forth between them and their captors in Vietnamese. One of
the prisoners was shot on the spot by the enemy. The weapon sounded
like an AK-47. LT Longgrear came back. The indigenous prisoners were
marched to the top of the TOC and we could hear much talking in Vietnamese.
It lasted for ten or fifteen minutes. We then heard much automatic weapons
fire, and assumed the prisoners had been killed. However, the next morning,
I saw no bodies. During the night I remember observing one truck, 1
½ ton type and not one of ours, driving down the road through
the camp toward the exit in the direction of Lang Troai. I fired on
it from the TOC with unknown results. It appeared to be carrying bodies.
Trucks seemed to be moving back and forth across the camp until about
0530 or 0600. At about 0430, the NVZ started digging a hole down the
North side of the TOC. Satchel charges and grenades were having no effect
on the inside of the TOC. They were apparently digging a hole six or
seven feet deep, close to the vent. The digging stopped and there was
much talking going on. Another grenade was tossed in, and then the satchel
charges in the hole went off, blowing out a portion of the north wall.
It left a hole about six feet across and four feet high. The enemy threw
fragmentation grenade through this hole. At about 0705, I was wounded
by a fragmentation grenade and I passed out at about 0800. We had been
trying to get our PRC 74 back in operation. Commo with Khe Sanh had
been lost twice. We were not in commo with Sergeant Ashley and the Laotian
Battalion at the old camp at this time. The last contact I had with
anyone on the top of the camp was when I heard Sergeant Tiroch on the
radio saying: "I have one round left. The tanks are coming right
at us." That was our last commo with the top of the hill and came
around 0200. When I came to, we had reestablished commo with Sergeant
Craig at the Laotian position, and with FAC. I came to at around 1100
hours. I learned that we had been in contact with FAAC for two hours.
I was informed that Sergeant Ashley and a reaction force were trying
to reach us. They were in the vicinity of Supply binker [sic] number
two and were on forth try. Ashley was taking small arms, automatic weapons,
and mortar fire and had to pull back. He made another try and made it
to the East 81mm mortar pit. A large volley of automatic weapons and
small arms fire came along the top of the hill. Communications was lost
with Ashley. Sergeant Tiroch came up on the PRC 25. I got on the horn
and was talking to my team sergeant and to LTC Schungel, who were at
the old camp Lang Vei. Sergeant Tiroch with the reaction force was somewhere
between the two camps and was receiving incoming artillery. He had t
withdraw. I talked to FAC and he said he had air support on call, fifteen
or twenty minutes out. We devised a plan for an escape attempt. We know
there was still automatic weapons and small arms fire on top of the
hill, and to the best of our knowledge the enemy was sitting on top
of the TOC. In twenty minutes AIE Skyraiders came in and I told the
FAC where I wanted the ordnance. They dropped 250 lb. Bombs thirty to
100 feet from our position. After they had expended their bombs, they
made runs with the 20mm. All firing ceased from on top of the hill.
We were still getting occasional grenades thrown in on us. I now heard
firing coming from the north and east portion of the camp; and I request
[sic] bombs, napalm, and strafing runs to be placed on those locations.
I got the troops together. All but two of them were wounded. Moreland
had been hit when the sappers blew the north wall. We tried to get him
up but he was frantic and began flinging his fists and arms, kicking
and yelling at the top of his lungs. With the amount of injured people
that we had on our hands, the decision was made to leave Moreland there.
We lost commo with the FAC and the 20mm stopped. We climbed out of the
TOC and received fire from the east end of the camp. We moved out in
the direction of supply bunker number two, filtering out in ones and
twos. Sergeant Phillips and I carried Sergeant Early out. LT Quy, VNSF,
met us at the front gate with a jeep. We put everybody in the jeep and
went back to the old camp. Time: about 1600. The old camp was receiving
mortar fire too. We requested the FAC to place bombs on the entire hill
with the exception of the TOC, and they did. LTC Schungel was trying
to get medevac ships in. Apparently he had been working on it for quite
some time. I got the breakdown on what actually happened and then we
prepared for the medevac, patching up to [sic] wounded. Marine CH-53's,
gunships, AIE Skyraiders, and jets wee on station. Major Quamo's chopper
came in and LTC Schungel and three men who couldn't walk were placed
on this chopper. Then the big ships came in together with the C &
C element which proceeded to set up the perimeter. The Laotians and
my troops were being evacuated. The exfiltration was being coordinated.
Major Quamo handled the entire operation. At around 1630 or 1700, I
was medevaced on the 6th or 7th chopper. To recap, I saw a total of
5 tanks, 1 truck, and about 20-50 NVZ during the attack. I heard about
a total of 11 tanks as well as enemy troop concentrations on the northeast
and west sides of the camp. I observed breaches in the camp wire on
the South and North sides. The south breach appeared to be made by tanks
and the north breach by troops. I saw three bodies when I was leaving
the hill. Two were DIDG and I would say one was and NVA. He was wearing
a gray khaki uniform, but had o weapon or headgear. The two CIDG had
their carbines laying [sic] by them. I didn't fire and LAW's, but LTC
Schungel told me later that he had five LAW's of top of the hill that
wouldn't fire. I saw one fired. It scored a first round hit on the lower
turret. It hit at an oblique angle and I guess it didn't do any damage.
I heard LT Wilkins say that some LAW's didn't fire. I also heard that
two tanks were knocked out with LAW's.
/s/Frank C. Willoughby
/T/ FRANK C. WILLOUGHBY
CPT, [Service Number]